It is well-known that malware constantly evolves so as to evade detection and this causes the entire malware population to be non-stationary. Contrary to this fact, prior works on machine learning based Android malware detection have assumed that the distribution of the observed malware characteristics (i.e., features) do not change over time. In this work, we address the problem of rnalware popuwtion drift and propose a novel online machine learning based framework, named DroidOL to handle it and effectively detect malware. In order to perform accurate detection, security-sensitive behavior are captured from apps in form of inter-procedural control flow sub-graph features using a state-of-the-art graph kernel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, mal ware detection for mobile platforms such Android has evolved as one of the challenging problems in the field of cyber-security. The number of new Android mal ware applications (apps for short) and their capabilities have grown tremendously in recent years. For instance, Kaspersky reports [1] detecting 4 million malware infections in 2015 which is a 216% increase over 2014. The sheer volume and growth rate of Android mal ware highlights an imperative need for developing sound and scalable automated malware detection process [2] - [7, 12] .
Malware detection using Machine Learning (ML) tech niques is predominant in various platforms (such as Windows, Android and the web) for more than a decade [2] - [7, 12] . This is because, these methods automatically learn the characteris tics that distinguish malware, when trained using a collection of malware and benign samples making them amenable for automated detection. ML based approaches extract features from an apps' behaviors and apply standard ML algorithms to perform binary classification. These approaches typically use semantic features such as system calls/Application Pro gramming Interfaces (APIs) invoked, resources and privileges used, control-and data-flows inside apps' execution to detect malicious behavior patterns [2] - [7, 12] .
Most of these mal ware detection techniques are based on batch-learning classifiers. Meaning, the detection model is built using a batch of labelled benign and malware samples and is subsequently used to predict whether a given new sample is benign or malicious. These batch-learning based methods are typically plagued by two challenges that make them unsuitable for real-world large-scale malware detection:
• Population drift. Though batch-learning based solutions are promising, their success is predicated on an important assumption that may not hold for the malware detection problem. That is, they assume that the mal ware population (i.e., training data) used to build the detection model does not change over time. However, mal ware does not fit this profile. The entire population of malware is constantly evolving due to various reasons such as exploiting new vulnerabilities, and evading novel detection techniques. This evolution has a profound impact on mal ware characteristics and thereby on malware features. This makes the collection of mal ware identified today not a representative of the ones generated in the future. This phenomenon is an epitome of population drift [17] . Since new malware features emerge and importances of features change over time, this popula tion drift leads to concept drift [17, 18] .
• Volume. As noted before, malware grows at an alarming rate and hence a scalable classifier is of paramount importance to practical large-scale mal ware detection. In order to keep abreast with drifting population, batch learners have to be frequently re-trained with huge volumes of data. Hence they pose severe scalability issues when used in the Android mal ware detection context where we have millions of samples already and thousands streaming in every day. Retraining frequently with such a volume renders them computationally impractical.
Our Approach. We take these two challenges into consider ation and propose DroidOL, an accurate, adaptive and scalable mal ware detection framework based on online learning, where we continuously retrain the model upon receiving each labeled sample and make prediction of a new sample using the updated model. We demonstrate that online learning based solutions are better suited for practical large-scale automated mal ware detection for two reasons: • Online learning based solution can process large numbers of apps more efficiently than batch methods.
DroidOL's achieves superior accuracy through extracting high quality features from inter-procedural control-flow graphs (ICFGs) of apps, which are known to be robust against evasion and obfuscation techniques adopted by malware [2, 5] . To this end, we use the Weisfeiler-Lehman (W L) graph kernel [13] that supports explicit feature vector representation of graphs to extract semantic features from ICFGs. DroidOL's adaptiveness and scalability are achieved through use of online learning.
Hence, the primary contribution of our paper is the success ful application of online learning algorithms to the problem of Android malware detection. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose such a framework and demonstrate its capabilities to handle population drift.
Experiments. DroidOL is evaluated through large-scale experiments on a recent real-world dataset of more than 87,000 apps. It is compared against two state-of-the-art batch-learning based Android mal ware detection techniques. DroidOL achieves 84.29% accuracy outperforming state-of the-art techniques by more than 24% in their typical batch learning and more than 3% when they are re-trained. Sub sequently, we show that continuous retraining over newly emerging features is crucial for adapting the detection model to detect new or evolving malware.
In summary, our paper's contributions are as follows:
• We propose and develop DroidOL, an accurate, scalable and adaptive Android mal ware detection framework which is based on online learning, where we do not assume that the malware population is stationary (in §III).
•
We conduct and report a large-scale comparative analysis of our framework against several re-trained variants of two state-of-the-art mal ware detection solutions on a sizable dataset of more than 87,000 apps (in §VI and VII).
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the related works on mal ware detection and also present our motivations in §II. The DroidOL framework is introduced in §III. Implementation details are discussed in §IV. DroidOL's evaluation, comparative analysis and relevant discussions are presented in sections V, VI and VII. Conclusions are presented in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK & MOTIVATION
ML based approaches are popular over the past decade for malware detection. Many existing works have successfully applied ML techniques for mal ware detection on various platforms such as Windows, Android and the web.
A. Related Work -Android Malware Detection 1) Primitive Approaches: In the case of Android, Crow droid [11] , Drebin [4] and DroidAPIMiner [8] are noticeable among the early approaches on ML based malware detection. These methods were designed to detect mal ware operating on the initial versions of Android, performing simpler attacks such as making premium-rated calls/SMS. Hence, they lever aged on primitive features such as system calls, Android APIs and permissions. These techniques detect mal ware through identifying suspicious usage patterns of the aforesaid features. In particular, Crowdroid [11] uses Linux system call sequences as features. Drebin [4] uses APIs, permissions, components, accessed URLs and Intent filters as features. DroidAPIMiner [8] considers sensitive APIs along with parameters and pack age level information as features. Even though these features are good enough for detecting simpler malware, they are easily evaded by modern mal ware that perform sophisticated attacks [7, 9] .
2) Robust Approaches: In order to detect stealthy malware, recent approaches leverage on two type of detection: (1) information-flow based detection and (2) graph based struc tural detection.
Information-flow based detection. These methods track the flow of sensitive information inside the apps' execution and detect malware by spotting suspicious flows. Even though these methods are highly precise, they exhibit poor scalability due to the expensive data-flow analysis they leverage on. Hence such methods are not suitable for practical large-scale malware detection [3, 4] . Mudflow [10], is a prototypical example of these types of detection methods.
Graph based structural detection. Graphs offer a natural way to model the sequence of activities that take place in a program. Hence they serve as amenable data-structures for detecting malware through identifying suspicious activity sequences. For this reason, graph representations such as call graphs, control-and data-flow graphs, control-, data-and program-dependency graphs have been widely used for mal ware detection in conjunction with graph mining techniques [2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12] . In the case of Android, DroidMiner [9] and Allix et al. [5] proposed to use control-flow graph based features to perform structural mal ware detection. DroidSIFT [7] and AppContext [2] proposed a more robust approach by including the contextual information of security-sensitive activities (i.e., whether or not the user is aware of such an activity) along with structural information captured through graphs.
These solutions are plagued by two limitations: (1) Loss of expressiveness: These solutions follow a naive approach to vectorise the graphs such as taking only individual nodes into consideration without their neighborhood. This leads to loosing the expressiveness of graphs.
(2) Poor efficiency: Many classic graph mining based ap proaches (e.g., [12] ) are NP hard and have severe scalabil ity issues, making them impractical for real-world mal ware detection [3] .
Graph Kernels for malware detection. Recently, efficient and expressive graph kernels such as WL kernel [13] have been proposed and widely adopted in many application areas (e.g, bio-and chemo-informatics, computer vision, etc.). Some of these kernels also support building explicit feature vector rep resentations of graphs. Taking notice of such a development, two approaches, Adagio [3] and Sahs et al. [6] used graph kernels to perform structural detection of Android malware.
B. Motivation
While all the above mentioned works focus on engineering robust features that can detect mal ware effectively, they do not address a key practical aspect of mal ware detection prob lem-malware evolution. As discussed in §I, many analytical studies such as [17, 21] have clearly highlighted that malware evolves in terms of its characteristics for various reasons. The evolution inevitably leads to profound changes in the mal ware features over time i.e., concept drift. This poses two challenges: (Cl) the detection model has to automatically adapt to the (C2) the detection model has to consider and account for new features that emerge over time.
IlL
Malware detection as a data-stream classification prob lem. While none of the existing Android mal ware detection techniques address this concept drift, we get a clear motivation to do so. While all the existing works consider malware detection as a static classification problem with a fixed training and test set, we note that this is against the real-world situation. Hence, we model it as a data stream classification problem.
As for the two aforementioned challenges, we address the first challenge (Cl) through the use of an online leaming classifier which adapts itself to the drift in characteristics of samples that stream in and for the second challenge (C2), we use a dynamic feature space, where the number of features keeps growing over time (see §VI-C for a detailed explanation). While we note that there a few approaches in the past that have adopted online leaming to tackle concept drift in malware for other platforms such as Windows [20] , we are the first to do so for Android.
Features. As discussed in the previous subsection II-A, graph based features have been proven effective and robust to several evasion strategies followed by mal ware and hence we use them. While choosing a particular graph representation, we note that building data-flow and data-dependency graphs is not scalable and call-graphs are too coarse-grained to capture the program semantics perfectly. Hence, we use ICFG repre sentation as they efficiently capture finer program semantics.
Graph Kernel. Since WL graph kernel [13] is the current state-of-the-art graph kernel, known for its expressiveness and efficiency, we use it to extract semantic features from ICFGs.
III. DROIDOL -FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
The overview of DroidOL framework which performs ac curate, adaptive and scalable mal ware detection using online learning is presented in Fig. 1 . DroidOL has three phases. We begin by performing static analysis on a given set of apps to get their ICFG representations. Subsequently, ICFG subgraph features are extracted using the WL kernel and the apps are represented as feature vectors. Finally, an online PA classifier is trained with these vectors to detect malware. Each of the phases is described in detail below. 1) Abstraction. Our malware detection approach considers node-labeled ICFG sub-graphs as features. To extract these features, we first perform Android-specific static analysis to 
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is a directed graph where N is a set of nodes and each node n E N denotes an instruction in the disassembled format. E <;;; (N x N) is a set of edges and each edge e ( nl, n2 ) E E denotes the control-flow from nl to n2. A is the set of security-sensitive Android APIs and R : N -+ A, is a labeling function which assigns an API as label to each node. 2) Feature Extraction & Representation. Once the ICFGs are constructed, (rooted) sub-graphs in these ICFGs that represent the security-sensitive behaviors in every app are extracted using the WL graph kernel [13] . Subsequently, ICFGs are represented as feature vectors. WL kernel. The WL kernel works by augmenting the labels of every node n with its neighborhood (up to a certain degree) in a given graph, G. The frequency of these enriched node labels which denote sub-graphs around every node in G are used as features to facilitate an explicit feature vector representation of G. Thus the process of obtaining feature vector representation of ICFGs in our dataset using WL kernel involves two steps: (1) Building a vocabulary, � of sub-graph features present across all ICFGs, (2) Transforming every ICFG into a feature vector with I � I dimensions.
Step (l) is presented in detail in Algorithm 1. Algorithm Explanation. The inputs to Algorithm 1 are g, a set of K ICFGs (one for each of the K apps in the dataset) and h, the degree of sub-graphs to be considered for feature extraction. The output is a vocabulary set � I PScout [19] , an existing research work identifies and lists the securitysensitive Android APIs. These APls are used for labeling our ICFO nodes.
that contains the unique sub-graphs upto degree h present across all ICFGs in g.
In each iteration i of the algorithm (lines 4 to 15), the neighborhood up to degree i around a node n is captured and condensed in the form of a neighborhood label, Ai(n).
These neighborhood label is what we refer to as sub-graph features. For every JCFGk E g, the following process is adopted to obtain these neighborhood labels.
For the initial iteration i = 0 no neighborhood information needs to be considered. Hence the neighborhood label Ao (n) is same as the original node label A(n) (line 7). For i > 0, the following procedure is used for label enrichment: Firstly, for a node n E N, all of its neighboring nodes are obtained and stored in N(n) (line 9). For each node mEN (n) the neighborhood label up to degree i-I is obtained and stored in multiset Mi (n) (line 10).
Subsequently, Ai-1 (n), neighborhood label of n till degree i-I is concatenated to the sorted value of Mi (n) to obtain the current neighborhood label, Ai (n) (line 11). Finally, the neighborhood label Ai (n) representing the i t h degree neighborhood around n is added to the vocabulary of sub graph features I; (line 13).
Once the vocabulary I; is obtained, we transform every JCFG E 9 into its corresponding vector representation by counting the frequency of every feature from I; in JCFGk. This procedure falls under the well-known Bag of-Features (BoF) representation model [13] , where every ICFG is considered as a bag of sub-graphs. relative importance) of each of the features used to predict the output label y. The predicted label, fj, is the sign of the inner product between X and w:
PA incrementally build the models in rounds. In round t,
PA receives a sample, Xt and predicts its label Yt using the current model; it then receives Yt, the true label of Xt and updates its model based on the sample-label pair: (Xt, Yt), if it makes a wrong prediction. That is, w is updated if the predicted label, Yt and the true label, Yt of the sample Xt are not the same. The goal of the PA algorithm is to update the model w as minimal as possible to correct for any mistakes it commits. PA solves the following optimization with each given sample: 1
2 Wt+! fargmin -llwtwll (2) w 2 subject to Yi (w . Xt) 2': 1 Updates occur only when Yt(Wt ·Xt) < 1., The closed-form update for all samples is as follows:
where a = m a x{ 1 -Yt( w,·x,) O} (we refer the reader to t IIxtll2 ,
the original work at [15 J for this derivation and further details on PA algorithm).
Once the PA classifier in DroidOL is trained with all these samples it is ready to perform mal ware detection at scale. It is important to note that since DroidOL is trained in an online fashion, it performs mal ware detection and simultaneously adapts to the changing trends in mal ware features by retraining on every sample it misclassifies.
Alternatives. As practitioners involved in building an online mal ware detection framework, we do not have any vested interest in a particular algorithm for online learning. Ultimately, we wish to determine the algorithm that scales well to problems of our size and yields the best performance. To that end, we experimented with other well-known online learning algorithms such as Online Perceptron (OP) and Stochastic Gradient Descent learning based Logistic Regression (LRsGD) along with PA. Since PA offered the best results in terms of accuracy, it is used in DroidOL. We believe this is because OP and LRsGD do not imbibe the notion of classification confidence and treat all misclassifications equally, unlike PA. PA, on the other hand, updates more aggressively when the margin of error is large and less aggressively in when it is small. While we note that evolving classifiers such as pClass [22] could be used for handling concept drift, we prefer PA over such methods, as it offers better efficiency.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION & COMPARATIVE ANALY SIS
We implemented the DroidOL framework in approximately 15,600 lines of Python and Java code. Soot 2 , a popular Android static analysis workbench is used for constructing the ICFGs of the apps in our dataset. Scikit-Iearn 3 toolbox is used for all our ML functionalities.
We compare our online learning based detection against two state-of-the-art Android mal ware detection solutions, namely Drebin [4] and Allix et. al.'s [5] . It is noted that both these methods use batch learning classifiers.
Drebin [4] is well-known for its scalable and explainable detection. It extracts light-weight features such as APIs, per missions, URLs accessed, names of components from apps and subsequently, trains a linear SVM classifier to distinguish mal ware from benign apps.
Allix et al. [5] recently proposed another scalable approach using structural features, namely CFG signatures. Therefore, we refer to this technique as CFG-Signature Based Detection (CSBD) in the reminder of the paper. CSBD constructs CFGs of individual methods and encodes them as text-signatures. Subsequently, a Random Forest classifier is trained with these signatures to detect malware.
V. DATA COLLECTION
We evaluate our approach on a recent large-scale real world dataset of 87,257 apps collected in-the-wild. These apps are collected from seven different Android markets 4 , namely, Google Play, Anzhi, AppChina, SlideMe, HiApk, FDroid and Angeeks, in 2014. Following the common practice in software security research, we use the Virus Total S web portal which hosts mal ware detection services from more than 40 Anti-virus scanners to determine the ground-truth labels of the apps. We infer that dataset contained 44,347 benign and 42,910 mal ware apps. The composition of the dataset is presented in Table I . It is noted that this is a subset of a large collection of apps used in [23] .
The date of creation of these apps fall in a span of 224 days starting from 1 Jan'14 to 13 Aug'14. We intend to sort these apps according to their date of creation and emulate a live feed of apps to the mal ware detectors considered in our experiments to examine how they cope up with the drift in the malware characteristics over time. To this end, we divide all the apps in the dataset (both benign and mal ware ) into batches according to their date of creation. Hence we have 224 batches, one for each day. The resulting time-line based distribution of the two datasets are presented in Fig. 2 .
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate DroidOL's accuracy and adap tiveness using the emulated live feed of apps. To this end, we 
A. Advantages of Online Learning
We start by evaluating the benefit of using online over batch learning for the problem of malware detection in terms of detection accuracy -in particular, whether the benefit of DroidOL's efficiency comes at the expense of accuracy. Specifically, we compare DroidOL's PA based classification against four different training configurations of a canonical batch learning classifier. We used Linear SVM as our canonical batch learner. It is noted that evaluations with other batch algorithms such as logistic regression yielded similar results.
Batch Learning Configurations. For SVM, we experiment with the following variants: SVM-Once, SVM-Daily, SVM MultiOnce, and SVM-MultiDaily. For SVM-Once, SVM clas sifier is trained only once on the apps from Day 1 (1 Jan '14) . This model is tested on all other days without retaining. For SVM-Daily, the classifier is retrained after every day; however, only one previous day's sarnples are used for every retraining -e.g., 11 Jan' 14 results reflect training on the apps created on 10 Jan' 14, and testing on 11 Jan' 14 apps. SVM-MuItiOnce is similar to SVM-Once and SVM-MultiDaily is similar to SVM-Daily, however, with the size of the batch for training and retraining covers 10 days instead of l. In summary, for Once and MultiOnce variants, the model is never re-trained and for Daily and Multi-Daily, the model is re-trained in a sliding window fashion over the batches of data. The size of MultiDaily training sets is determined to be lO-day batches based on the data that our evaluation machine with 32 GB RAM can handle. Figs. 3 (a) shows the cumulative error rates of DroidOL in comparison to the aforementioned variants of SVM. The following observations are made from Fig. 3 
(a):
• Updating the detection models over time is essential to detect new malware as shown by SVM-MultiDaily and SVM-Daily outperforming SVM-MultiOnce and SVM Once, respectively.
•
Training on significantly more data improves the per formance, as illustrated by SVM-MultiDaily and SVM MultiOnce outperforming SVM-Daily and SVM-Once, respectively. However, it is noted that there is a fun damental limit on the amount of data a batch-learning technique could train on because of the storage, memory and time requirements.
• Third, DroidOL consistently outperforms all the batch learnt variants. In particular, it outperforms the best re trained variant of SVM by more than 4% cumulative error rate. This is because DroidOL is able to adapt to the changes in the mal ware characteristics instantaneously as well as retain significantly useful information from the past. The above-mentioned SVM variants use the same features as DroidOL and hence it is sufficient to compare online and batch learning paradigms. However, this does not reflect the significance of DroidOL as a practical malware detector in the context of current state-of-the-art mal ware detection techniques. In order to study this, we compare DroidOL with two state-of-the-art malware detectors, namely, Drebin [4] and CSBD [5] .
For this comparison, we follow the same batch learning configurations described in §VI-A to arrive at the four variants of these techniques: Drebin/CSBD-Once, DrebinlCSBD-Daily, DrebinlCSBD-MultiOnce and Drebin/CSBD-MultiDaily.
The results of this comparison are presented in Fig 3 (b) and (c). From these figures we make the following inferences:
• For both these methods, the trends in performance of all four variants are similar to those of the SVM variants. Hence the observations made in §VI-A on frequently up dating the models and training with more data, hold. The error rates of best-performing variants of these methods are comparable to that of SVM-MultiDaily.
• DroidOL consistently outperforms the best performing variants of both the methods. Particularly, it outper forms Drebin-MultiDaily by more than 5% and CSBD MultiDaily by more than 3%. This reaffirms the suitabil ity of online learning for practical large-scale mal ware detection.
C. Training Regimen
Since DroidOL's feature extraction using WL kernel is based on BoF model, our number of features grows as the samples stream in. Fig. 4 shows the cumulative number of features for each day of the evaluations in our dataset, rep resenting the feature space growth. Each day's total includes new features introduced that day and all the old features from previous days. We obtained a total of 13,655 features from the mal ware and benign samples encountered on Day 1 (l Jan'14). Under the fixed feature set regimen, we train using a pre-determined set of features for all evaluation days. That is, we fix the features to those encountered up to Day 1, then we use those 13,655 features for the whole experiment. Variable feature-set training regimen. Under the variable feature-set regimen, we allow the dimensionality of our PA classifier to grow with the number of new features encoun tered; on the last day, for instance, we classify with more than 1.6 million features. Implicitly, examples that were introduced before a feature i was first encountered will have value 0 for feature i. Fig. 5 shows the importance of using variable feature set training over fixed feature-set training. We see that the performance for fixed feature regimen is significantly and consistently inferior to the variable feature regimen. The latter regimen has a 3.3% lesser cumulative error rate. This reveals that, continuous retraining with a variable feature-set allows a model to successfully adapt to new data and new features on a sub-day granularity. This adaptiveness is critical to realize the full benefits of online learning. This indicates that choosing the right training regimen can be just as important as choosing the right classifier. The aforementioned training regimens can help online algorithms stay abreast of changing trends in mal ware and benign apps' features.
VII. UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE
In this section we seek to get deeper insights into the superior performances of DroidOL's online learning and to understand how characteristics of the Android mal ware de tection task affects its performances. Specifically, we evaluate and quantify the importance of long term memory and fast model update. To this end, we pose the following question: Why does DroidOL outperform batch-learning solutions in detecting malware, even when they are re-trained?
Dataset. In order to provide insights into our results, we need the notion of similarity among the mal ware samples. More specifically, we need the malware to be grouped accord ing to their families. Malware familial analysis and grouping is currently a manual process [2, 4] . It is impractical to group apps from our large-scale dataset according to their families. Hence we use a well-known benchmark dataset that has �al�are readily �rouped ac�ording to their family, namely, Drebmsk [4] . DrebmsK contams a total of 5560 malicious Android apps belonging to 179 mal ware families. The date of creation of these samples lie in the range: Mar'09 to Oct' 12.
Familial similarity and Notations. We now introduce the notion of familial similarity between a pair of malicious apps.
We consider two malware ml and m2 as variants, denoted by ml rv m2, if they belong to the same malware family. For instance, DrebinsK dataset contains 965 samples belonging to 6In order to distinguish the dataset provided by Drebin authors from the Drebin malware detection technjque discussed in §YI, we refer to the dataset as Drebins K . the Fakelnstaller family. We consider each of pair of them as variants. This stems from the fact that mal ware belonging to the same family exhibit similar malicious characteristics, making them exhibit similar semantic features from a ML view point.
Subsequently, for each mal ware m, set M contains all the mal ware belonging to the same family as m. We calculate the time difference between the creation of m and every other malware, m' E M, denoted as 6.(m,m'). We call the minimum delay between another variant of the same family as m as minimum variant delay, denoted by 6.min(m). Similarly, we call the maximum delay between another variant of the same family as m as maximum variant delay, denoted by 6.max(m).
If there are no variants of for a malware m, its default values for 6.min(m) and 6.max(m) are 0 and D, respectively, where D is the difference between the date of creation of m and that of the latest app in DrebinsK dataset. Importance of fast model update. Fig. 6 depicts the head of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the minimum variant delay of the mal ware samples in the DrebinsK dataset. It is clear that nearly 80% malware have a minimum variant delay of zero days. Meaning, for a given mal ware sample, at least one other variant of the same of family is built (and prob ably released) on the same day itself. This is understandable as mal ware authors aim to maximize their gains by launching sev eral polymorphic variants of their mal ware, around the same time, leveraging on techniques such as obfuscation. Hence in order to keep abreast with quick-succession releases batch leaming solutions have to be updated at least daily (ideally, they have to be updated continuously). This explains why re training SVM/Drebin/CSBD solutions every day yields higher classification accuracy in sections VI-A and VI-B. Therefore, unless the detector is updated continuously to reflect the most recent features present in the last malware, it will not be able to effectively detect a majority of its variants.
Importance of long term memory. Fig. 7 depicts the head of the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the maximum variant delay of all the malware samples in the DrebinsK dataset. We observe that more than 40% of mal ware have a maximum variant delay of more than a year. Which means, a significant number of mal ware families keep evolving for a few years. This is understandable as malware authors make new variants either to evade known detection techniques or to improve/enhance their attacks for a prolonged period of time.
Therefore, if the batch size is limited to a few days or months, these 40% of mal ware would not have many similar variants in the batch. This leads to a significant reduction the detection accuracy because the detection model, has not yet learned enough on mal ware that is similar to these mal ware by the time it needs to classify them. In general, Fig. 7 demonstrates that classifying mal ware require long term mem ory. This explains why extending SVM/Drebin/CSBD batch sizes yielded better classification performance in sections VI-A and VI-B. However, when using batch-learning based detection solutions, the batch size is limited by the amount of available memory. Particularly, for a problem such as Android mal ware detection where we have millions of samples in a year and typical ML solutions extracting thousands of features, having a batch size of more than a year is not practical. On the other hand, online learning algorithms do not have this limitation. They retain significant useful information from all of the mal ware that they have seen. In other words, online algorithms operate with effectively infinite batch size. This explains why they have an edge over batch-learning solutions in our experiments.
Summary. From figures 6 and 7 it is clear that to perform reasonably accurate and adaptive malware detection, the batch learning solutions should re-train every day with a batch size of at least a year. This strategy is highly expensive in terms of computation time and resources, rendering it impractical. Hence, we can confidently conclude, online learning based methods which do not have such computational limitations and inherently adaptive are better suited for Android mal ware detection.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present DroidOL, an accurate, adaptive and scalable Android malware detection framework. DroidOL's unique feature is its ability to handle population drift in Android mal ware through the use of online learning. DroidOL exhibits high accuracy, as it extracts effective structural fea tures from apps using a state-of-the-art graph kernel. Further, DroidOL adapts automatically to the drift in mal ware char acteristics over time and exhibits high scalability, making it suitable for real-world mal ware detection.
Our large-scale evaluations on a real-world dataset demon strates that DroidOL outperforms state-of-the-art mal ware detectors. DroidOL achieves 84.29% accuracy outperforming existing techniques by more than 20% in their typical batch learning setting. This superior performance make DroidOL, in particular, and online learning based solutions, in general, better candidates for practical large-scale mal ware detection.
